Fudan Researchers Prove 28 LLMs Only Pretend to Think Like Humans
A new study of 28 LLMs reveals that human-like risk decisions can be a statistical illusion, not genuine behavioral alignment
Takeaways
- A study of 28 LLMs finds that human-like risk decisions are often surface mimicry, not genuine behavioral alignment.
- The St. Petersburg game (infinite expected value, low human bids) is used as a controlled testbed to separate outcomes from mechanisms.
- Most models bid finite amounts in the base game, but shift to computationally rational behavior when game parameters are structurally changed.
- Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning lower bids cosmetically but leave underlying decision mechanisms largely unchanged.
- The paper calls for mechanism-level evaluation in all high-stakes LLM decision-support applications (finance, insurance, medical triage).
- No code is released, but the prompt suite and methodology are detailed enough to replicate with any LLM API.
When an AI model declines to bet everything on a long-shot gamble, it looks cautious. It looks human. But a new paper from researchers at Fudan University and the University of Rochester argues that looking human and being human-like are two very different things -- and that most LLM evaluations cannot tell them apart.
LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. To stress-test this gap, the team turned to one of the oldest puzzles in decision theory: the St. Petersburg game.
A 300-Year-Old Trap for AI
The St. Petersburg game is deceptively simple. A fair coin is flipped until it lands heads up. The player wins $2^n$ dollars, where n is the number of flips until the coin lands heads up. The math says the expected payout is infinite -- you should theoretically pay any amount to play. Since this payoff has an infinite mean, for a risk-neutral player the fair price of the lottery should be infinite; however, few people are willing to pay more than $20 to play this game, thus the paradox.
The St. Petersburg paradox is the oldest paradox in decision theory and has played a pivotal role in the introduction of increasing concave utility functions embodying risk aversion and decreasing marginal utility of gains. In plain terms: humans cap their bids not because of a math error, but because of deeply embedded psychological mechanisms -- loss aversion, finite wealth intuitions, and diminishing marginal utility. The question the paper asks is: when an LLM also caps its bid, is it doing so for the same reasons?

The Experiment: 28 Models, One Paradox, Many Traps
The researchers evaluated 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts.